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Congress’s Competing Motivations: What Chevron Can Tell
Us About Constitutional Acquiescence
GEORGE KRUG*
This Note asks under what conditions the Supreme Court would find evidence of postFounding historical practice persuasive in separation of powers debates. This Note
focuses on two theories of how evidence of a long-standing historical practice might
be relevant in separation of powers disputes: constitutional liquidation and
historical gloss. According to both theories, the authority of a long-standing
historical practice depends in part on the motivations driving the relevant branch of
government to engage in that practice. Current scholarship on constitutional
liquidation and historical gloss, however, has not yet explored fully these motivations
in a way that recognizes the actual dynamics of interbranch relations.
This Note explores those motivations in detail by examining the motivations
driving Congress to grant its interpretive authority to an administrative agency
under Chevron. Ultimately, I conclude that Congress faces the same competing
motivations when granting its interpretive authority to an administrative agency as
when deciding to engage in a long-standing historical practice. As a result,
understanding how the Court interprets congressional motivations in the Chevron
context should inform how the Court views congressional motivations in the context
of constitutional liquidation and historical gloss. Moreover, because Chevron is
likely to be reformed in the near future, future changes to Chevron should indicate
when and to what extent the Court will find constitutional liquidation or historical
gloss persuasive in separation of powers debates.
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INTRODUCTION
“Constitutional law is . . . rife with claims of authority by historical practice.”1
This is because the Constitution’s meaning is not always clear.2 Historical practice
is one type of evidence of the Constitution’s meaning.3 Specifically, it encompasses
a wide range of sources interpreting the meaning of the Constitution after the
Founding, such as judicial opinions, congressional determinations, and presidential
actions.4 Scholars have relied on the authority of historical practice in recent debates
about court-packing schemes,5 the President’s power to declare war,6 and the
President’s power to confer recess appointments.7 Historical practice has informed
understandings of the Constitution since the Founding. As James Madison wrote,
“difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms
& phrases necessarily used in [the Constitution] . . . and . . . it might require a regular
course of practice to liquidate & settle the meaning of some of them.”8 In his famous
opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Frankfurter similarly
recognized the importance of historical practice in shaping the President’s
constitutional powers, finding an unbroken practice that is long carried out by the
President and unquestioned by Congress may be treated as a “gloss” on the executive
powers of the President.9

1. William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2019); see also
Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REV. 523, 537 (2018) (“[A]
popular claim as of late is that postenactment practice can render constitutional text clearer
or—more controversially—less clear.”).
2. See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 417–18 (2012); see also infra notes 42–54 and accompanying
text.
3. See Baude, supra note 1, at 3 (referring to historical practice as “a source of
constitutional meaning”).
4. See id. (“Historical practice is not quite the same as precedent, because it expands
well beyond judicial opinions.”); see also infra notes 64–66 and accompanying text
(discussing the repeated passage of statutes as well as various presidential actions as examples
of historical practices).
5. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional
Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 255, 270 (2017)
[hereinafter Bradley & Siegel, Historical Gloss and the Judicial Separation of Powers].
6. See, e.g., Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 461–68.
7. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice,
Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2014)
[hereinafter Bradley & Siegel, After Recess].
8. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014) (quoting James Madison, Letter to
Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 447, 450 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1908)).
9. 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken,
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
questioned, engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making
as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a
gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”).

2021]

CONGRESS’S COMPETING MOTIVATIONS

639

Nonetheless, the legitimacy of historical practice arguments has remained the
subject of debate among scholars10 and judges alike.11 To some, historical practice
arguments remain “a slippery, unhelpfully capacious notion masquerading as a midtwentieth-century neutral principle.”12 Part of the reason for this characterization is
that scholars have paid little academic attention to how historical practice arguments
can be used to interpret the Constitution’s separation of powers provisions.13 What
scholarship does exist on this topic suffers from another problem: it does not study
historical practice in a way that recognizes the actual dynamics of interbranch
relations.14 This is particularly problematic because the efficacy of historical practice
arguments in constitutional debates depends on the motivation driving that practice.15
This Note attempts to remedy this problem by arguing that the current debate
about the constitutionality of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. can shed light on when courts will find historical practice arguments
persuasive in debates about the separation of powers.16 This is because the

10. Baude, supra note 1, at 6–8; Michael B. Rappaport, Why Non-Originalism Does Not
Justify Departing from the Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 38 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889, 893 n.8 (2015) (finding not only that “[t]he use of practice as a mode
of interpretation or construction within originalism is sometimes controversial” but also that
the question of whether practice can liquidate the meaning of ambiguous provisions is a
“complicated question”).
11. See Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 572–73 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding that while “a
governmental practice [that] has been open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early days
of the Republic . . . should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous constitutional provision,”
a “self-aggrandizing practice adopted by one branch well after the founding, often challenged,
and never before blessed by this Court . . . does not relieve us of our duty to interpret the
Constitution in light of its text, structure, and original understanding”).
12. Baude, supra note 1, at 3 (quoting Alison L. LaCroix, Historical Gloss: A Primer,
126 HARV. L. REV. F. 75, 77–78 (2013)); see also Shalev Roisman, Constitutional
Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 668, 674–75 (2016).
13. See Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 413 (“Surprisingly, however, there has been little
sustained academic attention to the proper role of historical practice in the context of
separation of powers.”); Roisman, supra note 12, at 674–75 (calling attention to “a general,
and surprising, lack of rigor in how historical branch practice is used in separation of powers
interpretation”); see also Baude, supra note 1, at 8 (quoting Bradley et al., After Recess, supra
note 7, at 29).
14. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 413–14 (“[T]he existing literature has not assimilated
insights from political science concerning the actual dynamics of congressional-executive
relations, even though such work has heavily influenced other recent public law scholarship.”).
15. See infra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.
16. In fact, in a recent law review article for the Duke Law Journal, Johnathan Hall noted
the relationship between the scholarship surrounding historical gloss and the nondelegation
doctrine, a doctrine closely related to Chevron. Specifically, Hall noted “the relationship
between that recently blossoming area of scholarship and this age-old question deserves more
attention.” Johnathan Hall, The Gorsuch Test: Gundy v. United States, Limiting the
Administrative State, and the Future of Nondelegation, 70 DUKE L.J. 175, 180 n.25 (2020).
And while the focus of this Note is not the nondelegation doctrine, Hall seems to be suggesting
that historical gloss can be used to analyze various administrative law issues. While not the
primary focus of this Note, Section II.D can certainly be viewed as a historical gloss analysis
of Chevron.
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constitutional legitimacy of both long-standing historical practices and Chevron
deference depends on Congress’s motivations.17 Moreover, while Chevron’s twostep framework has its problems,18 Chevron is frequently debated and discussed and
will likely be changed in ways that are more attuned to Congress’s competing
motivations in the near future.19 As a result, the current debate surrounding Chevron
can provide scholars of historical practice with critical insights into how the Court
views evidence of Congress’s motivations, and thus the persuasive authority of
historical practice arguments.
This Note differs from other scholarship focused on the normative justifications
for using historical practice arguments in separation of powers debates.20 Instead, it
considers how we will know if the current Court is receptive to such arguments. Part
I of this Note introduces two theories of historical practice arguments: constitutional
liquidation and historical gloss. Part I then discusses the difficulty of ascertaining
Congress’s motivations and explains why the authority of historical practice in
constitutional interpretation depends on these motivations. Part II introduces
Chevron’s interpretive framework. Part II then explains that the authority of
Chevron’s interpretive framework also depends on Congress’s motivations and that
reforms to Chevron will indicate how the Court views evidence of congressional
motivations. Part III explains why these reforms will indicate how the Court views
evidence of historical practice in interpreting the Constitution’s separation of powers
provisions: Congress faces the same competing motivations in the Chevron context
as when assessing the constitutionality of a historical practice.
I. HISTORICAL PRACTICE AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
There are a variety of theories of constitutional interpretation drawing on
historical practice. The focus of this Note is on theories that look to a repeated course
of practice as evidence of the Constitution’s meaning. Such theories have more in
common with the way the Court has applied Chevron than other theories of historical
practice that do not require a repeated course of practice. Therefore, theories such as
Bruce Ackerman’s “constitutional moments” or Adrian Vermeule’s “constitutional
showdowns” will not be discussed.21 Instead, the focus of this Note will be on the
theories of constitutional liquidation and historical gloss. Section I.A discusses the
basic principles of these theories. In short, both are theories of interpreting
ambiguous provisions in the Constitution by looking beyond Founding-era evidence

17. See infra notes 25–30, 124–26 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 102–07, 133–40 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Madisonian
Liquidation, and the Originalism Debate, 106 VA. L. REV. 1, 40 (2020) [hereinafter Bradley
& Siegel, Historical Gloss and the Originalism Debate]; Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 461–
68.
21. Though invoking evidence of historical practice, these theories focus on “particularly
decisive moments in history” and “critical turning points” when the Constitution’s meaning
was decided. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 427. For reasons that will become clear, these
theories are less comparable to the well-established practice of deference to administrative
agencies embodied by Chevron.

2021]

CONGRESS’S COMPETING MOTIVATIONS

641

and judicial precedent and identifying agreements reached between the political
branches on a practice’s constitutionality.
A. Constitutional Liquidation and Historical Gloss
Both constitutional liquidation and historical gloss look beyond the limited scope
of Founding-era evidence and modern notions of stare decisis and look to postFounding historical practice by each of the branches of government to interpret the
Constitution’s meaning.22 Specifically, arguments based on historical practice
attempt to resolve uncertainty in constitutional provisions in a way that does not
disturb long-standing practices of the political branches.23 Arguments based in
historical practice are often invoked in the separation of powers context because
separation of powers disputes often “involve[] the ‘acquiescence’ of one branch in
the actions of another.”24 But, like other theories of constitutional interpretation,
historical practice theories do not attempt to explain the Constitution’s meaning in
all circumstances, and each theory differs in the way historical practice informs the
Constitution’s meaning.
Both constitutional liquidation and historical gloss use the acquiescence approach
to determine whether a given historical practice serves as evidence of that practice’s
constitutionality.25 Under the acquiescence approach, one branch’s long-standing
historical practice is indicative of the practice’s constitutionality only if the other
branch has “acquiesced” in that practice on the basis of constitutional analysis.26 The
primary justification for this approach is that acquiescence represents a legal or
functional agreement about the constitutionality of the practice.27 These justifications
are most persuasive if, in the separation of powers context, the actions of the political
branches are primarily motivated by constitutional analysis.28 However, a branch

22. See generally Baude, supra note 1, at 63 (discussing the similarities and differences
liquidation has with “other methods of giving weight to historical practice” such as historical
gloss).
23. See Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Constitutional Structure, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 789,
814–15 (2018).
24. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 414.
25. See Roisman, supra note 12, at 676 (“The primary way that historical practice is used
in constitutional interpretation of separation of powers issues is through the acquiescence
approach.”); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Doing Gloss, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 59, 75 (2017) (“If the
claim is that the two political branches have long had a shared understanding of the separation
of powers, the claim will require an especially strong form of acquiescence: actual interbranch
agreement about the law.”).
26. Roisman, supra note 12, at 676, 679. It is important to note, however, that
“acquiescence” has been given a range of meanings. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 433. The
focus of this Note, however, is on instances where acquiescence reflects an agreement that the
actions taken by the branches are lawful. In this context, the key question is whether the
branches share an understanding of the constitutional question at issue. Id.
27. Roisman, supra note 12, at 677. Scholars have posited other justifications for the
acquiescence approach as well. First, acquiescence should be privileged because it represents
an “interbranch bargain.” Id. at 678. Second, acquiescence may result in justifiable reliance
by the branches or other third parties on past practice. Id. at 678–79.
28. See id. at 684. If this is the case, the acquiescence model makes sense: it would suggest
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might act for any number of reasons without regard to the constitutional issue at
hand.29 For example, a political branch might act out of ignorance to the
constitutional issue, it might act based on preference for a certain policy outcome, or
it might act because it lacks the power to oppose another branch’s actions.30 Given
the competing motivations of the political branches, scholars recognize that when
past practice is used as evidence of the Constitution’s meaning, especially strong
evidence is required to show the political branches have reached an agreement on the
basis of constitutional analysis.31
Both constitutional liquidation and historical gloss recognize political branches
have motives beyond constitutional analysis and both consider how acquiescence
based on constitutional analysis might be determined. To Madison, “[a]ll new laws .
. . [were] considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be
liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”32
Madison’s theory of constitutional liquidation rested on two central principles: (1)
the Constitution does not have a fully determined meaning, and (2) indeterminacies
could be settled through subsequent practice.33 But not all long-standing practices
could liquidate the Constitution’s meaning. Rather, Madison’s theory of liquidation
had three requirements: (1) indeterminacy in the Constitution’s text, (2) a regular
course of deliberate practice, and (3) settlement.34
The theory of historical gloss, deriving from Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in
Youngstown,35 takes a similar approach.36 The basic idea of historical gloss “is that
long-standing practices by one political branch that are acquiesced in by the other
political branch should be given weight in discerning whether governmental conduct
is consistent with the separation of powers.”37 An early example of the Court
invoking historical gloss was McCulloch v. Maryland, where the Court used

that the practice resulted from agreement on the constitutional authority in question. Id.
29. Id. at 684–85; see also infra notes 76–86 and accompanying text.
30. See Roisman, supra note 12, at 684–85.
31. See id. at 710 (proposing a method of looking to past practice that “will attempt to
privilege only historic branch practice that is likely to be indicative of constitutional agreement
between the branches—as opposed to practice resulting from branch ignorance, apathy, policy
agreement, path dependence, or coercion”); see also Bradley, supra note 25, at 75 (“If the
claim is that the two political branches have long had a shared understanding of the separation
of powers, the claim will require an especially strong form of acquiescence: actual interbranch
agreement about the law. Mere long-standing practice and lack of resistance by another branch
will not be sufficient.”).
32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 287 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1864).
33. Baude, supra note 1, at 9.
34. Id. at 13.
35. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
36. See Bradley et al., Historical Gloss and the Originalism Debate, supra note 20, at 40
(“[I]t is not entirely clear whether and to what extent the concept of liquidation differs from
the historical gloss approach. Indeed, as we noted in the Introduction, the majority in Noel
Canning seemed to treat liquidation and gloss as the same phenomenon.”).
37. Bradley et al., After Recess, supra note 7, at 21; see also Bradley et al., Historical
Gloss and the Judicial Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at 261 (referring again to historical
gloss as “giv[ing] weight to longstanding practices of the government” when interpreting “the
distribution of constitutional authority between Congress and the President”).
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historical gloss to settle Congress’s authority to establish the national bank.38 While
historical gloss theory does not impose the same requirements that constitutional
liquidation uses to determine whether a long-standing practice can serve as evidence
of the Constitution’s meaning, historical gloss scholars have nonetheless
contemplated the significance of acquiescence given the competing motivations
driving political branch action.39 As the following discussion will make clear,
however, both constitutional liquidation and historical gloss lack a “consistent and
rigorous method of determining when past practice should be treated as the result of
constitutional agreement and when it should be treated as the result of other
factors.”40
B. Ascertaining Constitutional Agreement
The goal of Section I.B is to identify a problem for which current debates about
Chevron may provide an answer: When should a political branch’s long-standing
practice serve as evidence of the Constitution’s meaning?41 Section I.B.1 notes that
a long-standing practice can serve as evidence of the Constitution’s meaning only in
the presence of an ambiguous constitutional provision. Section I.B.2 notes that even
when the constitutional text is ambiguous, a practice may not serve as evidence of
the Constitution’s meaning, because Congress often engages in practices without
regard to that practice’s constitutionality.
1. Indeterminacy
Whether a political branch has adopted a practice on the basis of constitutional
agreement depends on the clarity of the Constitution’s text.42 In other words, for
historical practice to be relevant in determining the meaning of the Constitution, the
provision under consideration must be either ambiguous, meaning the word has more
than one possible meaning, or vague, meaning the word lacks precision in borderline
cases.43 Madison specifically imagined historical practice could settle the meaning
of the Constitution with regard to a specific kind of ambiguity: ambiguity in the
Constitution’s separation of powers provisions.44

38. 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819) (giving great weight to “[a]n exposition of the Constitution,
deliberately established by legislative acts, on the faith of which an immense property has been
advanced”); Bradley et al., After Recess, supra note 7, at 21–22 (describing McCulloch as an
early example of the court invoking historical gloss in interpreting the constitutional authority
of Congress and the President).
39. See supra notes 25–28.
40. Roisman, supra note 12, at 711 (emphasis in original).
41. See id. at 696 (“The problem is that we simply cannot automatically know from the
fact that a government act was taken that it was taken for constitutional reasons.”).
42. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 430 (“The more an interpreter deems nonpractice
evidence like the text and original understanding to be clear, the less likely the interpreter is
to credit historical practice that points in a different direction.”).
43. Baude, supra note 1, at 14.
44. See id. at 15 (discussing “the possibility of ambiguity in separation of powers disputes,
an ambiguity that ‘supposes the constitution to have given the power to one department only;
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When the Constitution’s text is ambiguous, historical practice may indicate an
agreement on the basis of constitutionality. For example, in “Constitutional
Liquidation,” William Baude discusses the example of the debate over the
constitutionality of the national bank. As Baude notes, the debate turned on a proper
understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause, specifically in relation to
Congress’s power to tax and borrow money.45 Madison believed the bank was neither
necessary nor “incident to the nature” of Congress’s powers.46 Congress, on the other
hand, thought otherwise, and the bank bill passed.47 Years later, when Chief Justice
Marshall considered the constitutionality of the bank, he recognized that had the
unconstitutionality of Congress’s actions been clear, liquidation would be
irrelevant.48 It was only “a doubtful question, one on which human reason may
pause” which could be “put at rest by the practice of the government.”49
Modern debates, such as the debate about the constitutionality of recess
appointments in NLRB v. Noel Canning, also indicate the importance of textual
ambiguity to historical practice arguments.50 In Noel Canning, the Court considered
the scope of the phrase “the Recess of the Senate” in the Recess Appointments
Clause.51 After considering the possible meanings of “the recess,” with consultation
to Founding-era evidence, the Court found the text to be ambiguous, and only then
were historical practice arguments invoked.52 Other debates, such as the debate
surrounding the constitutionality of court-packing schemes, indicate that some
arguments based in historical practice may not require a specific ambiguous textual
hook.53 In fact, unlike constitutional liquidation, historical gloss does not view
ambiguity as a “hard boundary”—where the text is clear, contrary historical practice
is possible, it is just much less likely an interpreter will accept that practice as
constitutional.54
Generally, however, where the constitutional text is clear, contrary historical
practice cannot serve as evidence of that practice’s constitutionality. For example, in
INS v. Chadha, the Court dismissed the long-standing historical practice of Congress

and the doubt to be to which it has been given’” (quoting James Madison, Helvidius Number
II (1793), reprinted in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS DEBATES OF 1793–1794: TOWARD THE
COMPLETION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 65, 68–69 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 2007))).
45. Id. at 21.
46. Id. at 21–22.
47. See id. at 22.
48. See id. at 24.
49. Id. at 24 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401 (1819)).
50. 573 U.S. 513 (2014).
51. Id. at 518–19 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2).
52. Id. at 526–28.
53. As Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel note, there is little in the text directly addressing
the constitutionality of court-packing. Bradley et al., Historical Gloss and the Judicial
Separation of Powers, supra note 5, at 270. The authors discuss Article III and Article I as
possible sources of authority, id. at 270, but note that debates about court-packing “lack . . . a
textual hook in the Constitution,” id. at 276.
54. See Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 431 (“The very fact that an interpreter deems that
materials like the constitutional text and original understanding point clearly in a particular
direction makes it less likely that the interpreter will accept an outcome pointing in another
direction.”).
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enacting “legislative veto” provisions as unconstitutional.55 Specifically, the Court
noted that “the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful
in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary
to the Constitution.”56 In finding the practice unconstitutional, the Court referred to
the “[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution” that “prescribe and
define the respective functions of the Congress and of the Executive in the legislative
process.”57
It should come as no surprise, then, that criticisms of historical practice arguments
tend to be originalist and formalist in nature. Formalists are those who believe the
Constitution establishes clear, understandable, and enforceable rules for the proper
separation of powers and are often associated with textualist approaches to
interpretation.58 Chadha is itself a textualist and formalist opinion.59 Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion in Noel Canning provides another example of originalist, and
formalist, reasoning incompatible with historical practice arguments. In finding the
long-standing practice of intra-session recess appointments to be unconstitutional,60
Scalia determined, after consulting Founding-era evidence, the plain meaning of the
text at issue, “the Recess,” referred unambiguously to the gap between sessions, not
“breaks in the midst of a session”.61 Justice Scalia, however, did not reject the use of
historical practice arguments in all contexts and specifically recognized that “where
a governmental practice has been open, widespread, and unchallenged since the early
days of the Republic, the practice should guide our interpretation of an ambiguous
constitutional provision.”62
Both constitutional liquidation and historical gloss recognize, however, that more
than ambiguity is required for historical practice to serve as evidence of the
Constitution’s meaning. Otherwise a “single act in the face of indeterminacy” would
be sufficient evidence of constitutionality, and the Constitution’s meaning would not
limit government’s actions as long as the relevant provision was indeterminate.63

55. See 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983); see also Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 423 (concluding
that the Court in INS v. Chadha “held that a ‘legislative veto’ provision enacted by Congress
was unconstitutional”).
56. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944.
57. Id. at 945.
58. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 1939, 1958 (2011) (“[W]ithin the tradition of ordinary textual interpretation . . . are
formalist opinions resisting the perceived reassignment of a power from one branch to another,
contrary to the allocation originally effected by one of the Vesting Clauses.”). Functionalists,
by contrast, believe the text of the Constitution provides little guidance. Id. at 1950. Given the
Constitution’s “silences,” functionalists believe Congress, aided by the Necessary and Proper
Clause, is responsible for determining how the government’s powers are to be carried out. Id.
at 1951.
59. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 431.
60. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 575 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring).
61. Id. (“The Court’s contrary conclusion—that ‘the Recess’ includes ‘breaks in the midst
of a session,’ . . . —is inconsistent with the Constitution’s text and structure, and it requires
judicial fabrication of vague, unadministrable limits on the recess-appointment power . . . .”).
62. Id. at 572.
63. Baude, supra note 1, at 16.
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2. Deliberation and Settlement
Only a regular course of practice can fill out the meaning of an ambiguous
constitutional provision.64 Baude’s discussion of the constitutionality of the national
bank suggests the repeated actions of successive legislatures, specifically Congress’s
repeated passage of statutes reinforcing the constitutionality of the bank bill,
constitutes such practice.65 Curtis Bradley and Neil Siegel examined the extent to
which congressional action supports the constitutionality of court packing, looking
to repeated instances where Congress had altered the size of the Court after the
Founding.66 The Supreme Court in Noel Canning looked to presidential actions
interpreting the recess appointment power and instances where a federal court
affirmed that power.67 The purpose of this requirement is to prevent practices that are
engaged in for nonconstitutional reasons, such as political will, from being credited
as interpreting the meaning of the Constitution.68
But Madison knew that even a regular course of practice may result from political
will and not genuine constitutional agreement between the branches. This is because,
as historical gloss theorists have studied more closely, political branches often act
for a number of reasons beyond constitutional analysis.69 To combat the possibility

64. Madison had a variety of names for such a course of repeated practice: “[A] ‘regular
course of practice’; a ‘course of practice of sufficient uniformity and duration’; a ‘continued
course of practical sanctions’; ‘reiterated sanctions ... thro’ a long period of time’; a ‘settled
practice, enlightened by occurring cases’; a ‘course of authoritative, deliberate and continued
decisions’; or a ‘course of authoritative expositions sufficiently deliberate, uniform, and
settled.’” Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted).
65. See id. at 23–24. Baude specifically discusses McCulloch v. Maryland, where Chief
Justice Marshall stated the constitutionality of the bank had “been recognised by many
successive legislatures” and that “[a]n exposition of the constitution, deliberately established
by legislative acts, on the faith of which an immense property has been advanced, ought not
to be lightly disregarded.” Id. at 24 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 401
(1819)).
66. See Bradley et al., Historical Gloss and the Judicial Separation of Powers, supra note
5, at 270–72. Bradley and Siegel specifically examined congressional statutes passed
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the passing of which are discussed later in
this section. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
67. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 528 (2014) (“In 1867 and 1868, Congress
for the first time took substantial, nonholiday intra-session breaks, and President Andrew
Johnson made dozens of recess appointments. The Federal Court of Claims upheld one of
those specific appointments, writing ‘[w]e have no doubt that a vacancy occurring while the
Senate was thus temporarily adjourned’ during the ‘first session of the Fortieth Congress’ was
‘legally filled by appointment of the President alone.’” (quoting Gould v. United States, 19 Ct.
Cl. 593, 595–96 (1884))).
68. See Baude, supra note 1, at 16. To Madison, a practice could liquidate the meaning
of the Constitution if it “ha[d] the uniform sanction of successive Legislative bodies, through
a period of years and under the varied ascendancy of parties.” Id. (quoting Letter from James
Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON, FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 186 (Philadelphia, J.B.
Lippincott & Co. 1865)).
69. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. Each of these possible motivations
will be discussed more fully below.
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that a branch has engaged in a practice on grounds other than constitutional
agreement, constitutional liquidation and historical gloss employ a method for
determining when a practice should be treated as resulting from constitutional
analysis and when it should be treated as resulting from other factors.70 Madison’s
theory of liquidation requires constitutional “deliberation” and “settlement.”71 While
not articulating any specific requirement, Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison’s
study of historical gloss suggests constitutional interpreters should look for
affirmative evidence that the branches acted on the basis of constitutional
understanding.72 Both approaches can be viewed as variations of the constitutional
acquiescence model, which states that past practice can inform constitutional
meaning if one branch has engaged in conduct consistently and the other branch has
“acquiesced” in that conduct.73
One possible source of evidence is the creation of reliance interests. As Bradley
and Morrison note, when one branch of government has been engaging in a practice
for a long time, that branch of government and affected third parties may begin to
generate reliance interests if that practice is not resisted.74 Bradley and Morrison use
the example of the treaty process to illustrate the formation of such an “implicit
bargain.” While the Constitution states that the Senate should provide “Advice and
Consent” to the conclusion of treaties, Presidents have not granted the Senate such a
role since the early days of the Constitution.75 Instead, the Senate has long exercised
the power to consent to treaties with “reservations” on particular terms.76 Similarly,
in Noel Canning, the recess appointments case, the Court expressed concern for
upsetting the compromises and working arrangements reached between the
branches.77 Such agreements may represent express agreement on the basis of
constitutional law but might merely reflect the practice’s utility, or an agreement over
the practice’s feasibility and desirability, rather than a formal notion of legality.78
This is because, even where branches have relied on the practices initiated by
another branch, an agreement is not certain to have resulted from constitutional

70. This method amounts to raising the standard of proof, requiring a branch make an
affirmative showing that an agreement was reached based on constitutional factors, not other
factors. See Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 448 (“[W]here acquiescence is the touchstone of
the analysis, the standard for legislative acquiescence should be high.”).
71. See Baude, supra note 1, at 18–19.
72. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 451.
73. Roisman, supra note 12, at 672 (citing Ryan M. Scoville, Legislative Diplomacy, 112
MICH. L. REV. 331, 391 (2013)).
74. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 435.
75. Id. at 436.
76. Id.
77. Bradley, supra note 25, at 74. The Court in Noel Canning expressed concern for
“upset[ting] the compromises and working arrangements that the elected branches of
Government themselves have reached” and about “seriously shrink[ing] the authority that
Presidents have believed existed and have exercised for so long.” NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573
U.S. 513, 526, 549 (2014). Moreover, the Court observed that “three-quarters of a century of
settled practice is long enough to entitle a practice to ‘great weight in a proper interpretation’
of the constitutional provision.” Id. at 533 (quoting Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 689
(1929)).
78. See Bradley, supra note 25, at 66.
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analysis. For example, a historical practice may reflect a strategic decision to push
through policy in a way that generates the least political resistance. As previously
discussed, Article II of the Constitution allows the President to make treaties “by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate . . . provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur.”79 However, Presidents have long concluded treaties by receiving the
approval of Congress instead.80 Part of the reason for this alternative arrangement is
not because of any express or indirect agreement on the constitutionality of such
“congressional-executive” agreements but instead because “[t]he executive branch
found it much easier to conclude international agreements by seeking the approval
of a majority of Congress rather than that of two-thirds of the Senate.”81
Moreover, Congress may agree, or fail to object, because it has difficulty resisting
encroachments on its authority. First, Congress faces structural impediments—
legislation is passed only where it has been approved by both houses of Congress,
the President has declined to exercise his veto power, and, if the President does veto,
a supermajority has been reached in both houses.82 Beyond these procedural
limitations, Congress also faces collective action problems—because all members of
Congress benefit when legislative authority is enhanced, each individual member has
little incentive to expend their own resources defending this power, especially
because the gains are so dissipated.83 As a result, even when the executive is
expanding its power, Congress will have difficulty in defending its power from
usurpation.84
The most direct evidence of constitutional acquiescence on the basis of
constitutionality is express agreement by Congress that a practice is constitutional.
As Bradley and Morrison note, however, such direct evidence is rare.85 One example
was when Congress, in the 1973 War Powers Resolution, expressly agreed with the
executive branch that the President had constitutional authority to use military force
when responding to “a national emergency created by attack upon the United States,
its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”86 Elsewhere in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Court noted Congress had long enacted statutes
granting the President broad foreign affairs authority, which allowed the Court to

79. Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 468 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
80. Id. at 468–69.
81. Id. at 469.
82. Id. at 440.
83. Id. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule expound on this idea in The Executive Unbound,
noting that because Congress is a “they,” not an “it,” legislators have a hard time organizing
to oppose actions taken by the executive. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE
EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 24 (2010).
84. See Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 441. Moreover, members of Congress have less
incentive than the President to protect the interests of the branch as a whole because their
primary focus is largely on reelection. See id. at 441–42. Presidents, on the other hand, “have
both the will and the capacity to promote the power of their own institution, but individual
legislators have neither and cannot be expected to promote the power of Congress as a whole
in any coherent, forceful way.” Id. at 443 (quoting Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The
Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 145 (1999)).
85. See id. at 433.
86. Id. at 433–34 (quoting H.R.J. Res. 542, 93d Cong. (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1541(c) (2006))).
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conclude the delegation of criminalization authority did not violate the separation of
powers.87
But even direct evidence may result from nonconstitutional motivations. This may
be the case where the relevant actors prefer an outcome as a matter of policy.88 For
example, though Congress had repeatedly passed statutes changing the size of the
Court throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it had often done so in
politicized circumstances: among other examples, in 1801, the size of the Court was
reduced from six to five by the lame-duck Federalist Congress in order to deny
incoming President Thomas Jefferson an appointment; in 1837, with Democrats in
control of the political branches, Congress increased the size of the Court to nine in
order to place one justice in each of the nine circuits, which meant, because the
majority of circuits were composed entirely of slave states, a majority of judges
resided in slave states; and during the Civil War, the Court was expanded to ten to
accommodate the addition of another circuit when California was added to the
Union.89 Bradley and Siegel suggest that the circumstances in which these actions
were taken likely have some effect on how broadly these examples can be read as
acquiescence on the basis of constitutionality.90 Bradley and Morrison expressed
similar concerns about the ability of past uses of force to act as precedent in the
debate over the President’s authority to initiate military conflicts without
congressional authorization.91
In summary, the problem with using branch acquiescence as evidence of a
practice’s constitutionality is that we simply cannot know automatically from the fact
of a government act whether that act was taken for constitutional reasons.92 Baude
claims constitutional liquidation is insulated from this criticism because liquidation

87. Bradley, supra note 25, at 69 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 329 (1936)). In Curtiss-Wright, the Court found that “[t]he uniform, long-continued
and undisputed legislative practice just disclosed rests upon an admissible view of the
Constitution which, even if the practice found far less support in principle than we think it
does, we should not feel at liberty at this late day to disturb.” Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 329.
88. See Roisman, supra note 12, at 688–89 (“Several scholars have noted that past
practice might be motivated by nonconstitutional reasons, such as policy agreement or
politics.”).
89. Bradley et al., supra note 5, at 271–72.
90. See id. at 272–73. That Congress has changed the size of the Court in a variety of
circumstances, sometimes when politically motivated, may suggest Congress has broad
authority to alter the Court, both for concerns over workload and efficiency and for ideological
concerns. Id. Such practice may also indicate, however, that the power to change the size of
the Court is limited to specific circumstances and may not support Congress changing the size
of the Court in other contexts, as a reaction to disagreeing with specific decisions of the Court,
for example. See id. at 273.
91. See Bradley et al., supra note 2, at 465 (“Prior uses of force have varied along
numerous dimensions—such as duration, risk to U.S. forces, connection to U.S. national
security interests, and level of international support—often making it debatable whether a
given action in the present falls within past precedents.”); see also Baude, supra note 1, at 47–
48 (noting the usage of past practice can be problematic “because past practice often reflects
nonconstitutional concerns, and, moreover, ‘will systematically serve to validate the power of
the more active and powerful branch.’” (quoting Roisman, supra note 12, at 673)).
92. Roisman, supra note 12, at 696.
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requires “attention to the constitutional issue.”93 Certainly liquidation’s
“deliberation” requirement increases the likelihood that historical practice will be
credited only when branches are acting on the basis of constitutional analysis. But
Baude provides little direction on how “deliberation” may be shown.
Baude and Shalev Roisman offer two further methods of how acquiescence on the
basis of constitutional analysis can be distinguished from acquiescence motivated by
other factors. In addition to indeterminacy and deliberation, Baude discusses
Madison’s third requirement for liquidation: settlement. Settlement requires that (1)
those that opposed the practice have stopped doing so, and (2) the practice received
“public sanction.”94 In other words, the liquidated practice had been sufficiently
repeated without controversy.95 Roisman has articulated a similar but stronger
requirement: not only must the constitutional authority be considered by the branches
involved, but acquiescence would be most persuasive when acquiescence on
nonconstitutional grounds is unlikely.96 This would be the case where, for example,
the branch disagrees with the resulting policy outcome or is controlled by the
opposing party but nonetheless acquiesces in the practice.97
But whether the Court adopts Baude’s or Roisman’s approach or any other
approach to constitutional acquiescence remains to be seen.98 In the sections that
follow, this Note argues that current debates about Chevron can indicate when the
Court will find historical practice persuasive in interpreting the Constitution. This is
because Chevron’s two-step framework, as well as current and future reforms, will
demonstrate how the Court examines congressional intent.
II. CHEVRON AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACQUIESCENCE
MODEL
The goal of this Note is not to argue whether specific changes to Chevron should
be imported into the constitutional acquiescence model. Chevron, as it now stands,
is a mess99 and is likely to be cabined and reformed in the future.100 Nonetheless, this

93. See Baude, supra note 1, at 48.
94. See id. at 18–19.
95. See id.
96. See Roisman, supra note 12, at 712–16.
97. Id. at 715–16.
98. See Baude, supra note 1, at 69 (stating that “[W]hether we adopt [liquidation] or reject
it, we will learn much from it.”).
99. Kurt Eggert, Deference and Fiction: Reforming Chevron’s Legal Fictions after King
v. Burwell, 95 NEB. L. REV. 702, 780 (2017); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107
GEO. L.J. 1613, 1615 (2019) (“Chevron’s foundations are cracking.”). Chevron originally
stood for the notion that when considering the agency’s construction of a statute, a court faces
two questions. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
The first question is “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”
Id. If Congress’s intent is clear, the court must give effect to Congress’s intent. Id. at 842–43.
If Congress is “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” however, the court
considers whether the agency’s interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the
statute.” Id. at 843.
100. As Sunstein states, “the Court has been taking significant steps toward domesticating
it; the process is well underway.” Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1672.
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Part argues that the way the Court cabins Chevron in response to this mess can inform
models of constitutional acquiescence because both Chevron and the constitutional
acquiescence model face the same challenges: specifically, that Congress often takes
action for a host of reasons and it is often hard to determine whether Congress has
acted on the basis of constitutional motivations. Section II.A proceeds with a brief
explanation of Chevron step one. Section II.B discusses why constitutional
arguments for overruling Chevron are not particularly persuasive and that the
constitutional authority of Chevron rests on congressional instructions. Section II.C
discusses recent reforms to Chevron as well as possible future reforms to Chevron
and how they indicate the way the Court examines evidence of congressional
motivations. Finally, Section II.D concludes with a discussion of the competing
motivations Congress faces in passing a statute to which Chevron is applied. Because
Congress faces the same competing motivations in the context of Chevron as when
choosing to engage in a historical practice, the way the Court reforms Chevron will
also indicate when it finds historical practice persuasive in interpreting the
Constitution’s separation of powers provisions.
A. Brief Overview of Chevron Step One
As the constitutional acquiescence model recognizes, it is difficult to know
whether Congress has acted on the basis of constitutional motivations or other
competing motivations.101 Nonetheless, Chevron rests on the assumption that when
Congress has not clearly resolved an issue, Congress has intended for an
administrative agency, rather than a court, to fill the gap.102 But this assumption is
nothing more than a legal fiction.103 As Eben Moglen and Richard Pierce note,

101. See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1623. Here, Sunstein points out a fundamental issue
with the Supreme Court’s current approach to deference: “Why is it right to assume that when
agencies have exercised rulemaking or adjudicatory authority, Congress has instructed courts
to defer to agency interpretations of law? There is no clear or direct evidence that Congress
wanted that.” Id. at 1663.
102. Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law of
Stare Decisis, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1125, 1154 (2019) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (“If
Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such
legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a
particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrator of an agency.”)); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001)
(“Yet it can still be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other
statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the
force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute . . . .”).
103. Kurt Eggert, Deference and Fiction: Reforming Chevron’s Legal Fictions after King
v. Burwell, 95 NEB. L. REV. 702, 739–40 (2017) (“Chevron employs the fiction that any gap
in a statute administered by an agency constitutes an implicit delegation of interpretive power
to federal agencies.”); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine,
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 224 n.85 (2001) (noting Justice Breyer’s observation that “[f]or the
most part courts have used ‘legislative intent to delegate the law-interpreting function’ as a
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“Congress rarely ‘intends’ to give the President greater policymaking power.”104 In
fact, though Congress could clearly make its intent known on the deference question,
it rarely chooses to do so.105 As the Court notes in Chevron, Congress may leave gaps
in statutes for a number of reasons: Congress, for example, may simply desire the
agency’s expertise, it may simply not have addressed the question, or it may be
unable to form a coalition around the issue.106 Nonetheless, courts treat the presence
of such gaps as a delegation of interpretive power to agencies because “[f]or judicial
purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred.”107
Of course, Chevron imposes some limits on when agency deference can be
implied from Congress’s actions. This approach is Chevron’s two-step standard of
review,108 which “instructs courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute
the agency administers if, at step one, the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous
and then, at step two, the agency’s interpretation of the statutory ambiguity is
reasonable.”109 Focusing specifically on step one, in which the question of whether
Congress intended to defer to an agency is considered, the Court in Chevron stated,
“First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.”110
Step one, in other words, requires an inquiry into whether Congress’s instructions
are ambiguous.111 The focus of this Note is on step one because step one will be most
informative to the problem facing the constitutional acquiescence model: whether
Congress acted on the basis of constitutional reasons or on the basis of other
competing motivations.

kind of legal fiction” (quoting Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986))). In determining whether Congress intended for
delegation, however, the Court in Mead found authorizations to engage in rulemaking or
adjudication that produces regulations entitled to deference were a good indicator. Mead, 533
U.S. at 229–30.
104. Eben Moglen & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sunstein’s New Canons: Choosing the Fictions
of Statutory Interpretation, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1213 (1990).
105. See Barron et al., supra note 103, at 212; John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1932 (2015) (“In no opinion has the Court premised its application
of Chevron on the existence of legislative history suggesting that Congress preferred or
disfavored a deferential approach under a given organic act.”).
106. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
107. Id.; Eggert, supra note 103, at 741.
108. Scholars have frequently referred to Chevron’s two-step interpretive framework as a
standard of review. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s
Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1444 (2017) (“Chevron is, primarily, just a standard
of review rather than a rule of decision.”); Kevin M. Stack, The Interpretive Dimension of
Seminole Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 680 (2015) (referring to Chevron as a standard
of review); E. Garrett West, A Youngstown for the Administrative State, 70 ADMIN. L. REV.
629, 661 (2018) (stating Chevron is not a canon but is much like a standard of review).
109. Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review,
16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 110 (2018) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (1984)).
110. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
111. See supra text accompanying note 109.
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B. Constitutional Concerns
Chevron can inform our understanding of acquiescence because it is not likely to
be found unconstitutional, despite arguments to the contrary. That is not to say judges
are not concerned about Chevron’s constitutionality, however. For example, in his
concurring opinion in Michigan v. EPA, Justice Thomas found that Chevron prevents
judges from exercising their independent judgment to “say what the law is,” thereby
conflicting with Article III’s vesting clause, which vests the judicial power
exclusively with Article III courts, rather than administrative agencies.112 Recent
criticisms by Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh have echoed these concerns.113
In particular, Justice Kavanaugh has criticized Chevron on the grounds that it allows
the executive branch to choose an interpretation of an ambiguous statute, and so long
as that interpretation is reasonable, that interpretation carries the force of law even if
everyone else tasked with interpreting the statute believes there is a better
interpretation.114 Chevron has also given rise to Article I concerns. As Justice Jordan
of the Tenth Circuit pointed out in Egan v. Delaware River Port Authority, Chevron
erodes Congress’s legislative powers by encouraging Congress to abdicate its
lawmaking authority by passing vague laws to be filled in and interpreted by
agencies, rather than taking on the greater burden of reaching a consensus on difficult
issues.115
These arguments are unconvincing for a number of reasons, however.116 First, as
a practical matter, the costs of overturning Chevron would be significant and would
likely result in confusion, conflicts in the courts of appeals, and increased
politicization of administrative law.117 Moreover, not only has Chevron reduced the
effects of judicial policy preferences—one of its intended goals—but it has also
generated a significant amount of reliance interest among agencies and Congress.118
Finally, as Nicholas R. Bednar and Kristin E. Hickman note, “[a]rguments abound

112. Walker, supra note 109, at 111–12 (quoting Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Chevron deference precludes judges from exercising that
judgment, forcing them to abandon what they believe is ‘the best reading of an ambiguous
statute’ in favor of an agency’s construction.”)).
113. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L.
REV. 937, 950 (2018) (“Reaching back to the foundational case of Marbury v. Madison, Justice
Gorsuch pointed out that under that case, resolution of questions of private legal rights is a
judicial function. Chevron, he said, ‘seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the
abdication of the judicial duty.’” (quoting Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152
(2016))); see generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
114. Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1616–17. This is a result Justice Kavanaugh finds to be
“[a]mazing.” Id. at 1617 (quoting Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129
HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2150 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES
(2014))).
115. Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 279 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.,
concurring).
116. See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1670 (“[E]ven for those who think that Chevron was
not close to right, the argument for overruling it is not terribly strong.”).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1671–72.
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justifying congressional delegations of discretionary power to agencies.”119 Among
these reasons are a congressional desire to utilize agency policy and scientific
expertise, which increase statutory quality and reduce enforcement headaches after
passage.120
Nor is Chevron likely to be completely overturned as a matter of constitutional
law. As an Article III issue, Professor Henry Monaghan has noted that the Court is
not neglecting its duty to “say what the law is” by deferring to an agency’s
interpretation of a law; rather, the Court is simply applying a law made by a
congressionally authorized agency.121 As for Article I concerns, Congress can make
a constitutionally permissible delegation by providing the authorized agency with an
“intelligible principle” to guide its interpretation.122 It is not difficult for Congress to
satisfy the “intelligible principle” standard and avoid constitutional concerns.123 In
fact, the Court has stated that Chevron rests on the presumption that when Congress
passes an ambiguous statute intended for an agency to interpret, Congress has
delegated the agency, rather than the courts, the interpretive authority required by the
ambiguity.124

119. Bednar et al., supra note 108, at 1454.
120. Id.
121. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27–
28 (1983) (“In this context, the court is not abdicating its constitutional duty to ‘say what the
law is’ by deferring to agency interpretations of law: it is simply applying the law as ‘made’
by the authorized law-making entity.”); Siegel, supra note 113, at 960 (“That is, an ambiguous
agency statute is simply another way of doing something that Congress does all the time—
namely, authorize an agency to make a policy choice. Innumerable statutes expressly authorize
agencies to make decisions and prescribe rules that have the force and effect of law, and such
authorization is routinely approved as constitutional.”); Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1639.
Sunstein understands Monaghan to mean “it is (emphatically) the province of the judiciary to
say what the law is. But sometimes the law is what the Executive Branch says that it is. When
is that? When Congress says so.” Id.
122. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)); see also Sunstein, supra note
99, at 1637.
123. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474 (“In the history of the Court we have found the requisite
‘intelligible principle’ lacking in only two statutes, one of which provided literally no guidance
for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire
economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring
‘fair competition.’”); see also Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1637 (“If Congress uses a word like
‘take,’ ‘source,’ or ‘diagnosis,’ and stipulates that the agency may sort out ambiguities in such
terms, then it has provided an intelligible principle; it has not given any kind of blank check.”).
124. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996) (noting Chevron rests
on the “presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and
foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever
degree of discretion the ambiguity allows”); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 229 (2001) (noting while Congress may not have expressly delegated interpretive
authority to an agency, “[w]hen circumstances implying such an expectation exist, a reviewing
court has no business rejecting an agency’s exercise of its generally conferred authority to
resolve a particular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency’s chosen resolution seems
unwise”).
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As a result, Chevron seems to depend on congressional instructions.125 That is, if
Congress has instructed an agency to interpret an ambiguous statute, then Chevron
deference is insulated from constitutional concerns.126 Congress may instruct agency
deference for a number of reasons. For example, part of the Court’s reasoning in
Chevron was a respect for the Executive Branch’s democratic accountability.127 The
Chevron Court also recognized “agency expertise” as a possible rationale for
deference, stating Congress may have “desired the [agency] to strike the balance at
this level, thinking that those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for
administering the provision would be in a better position to do so.”128 Congress may
also defer to agencies on the basis of a desire for national uniformity.129
C. Current and Future Chevron Reforms
But just as the constitutional acquiescence model has recognized, congressional
instructions are not always clear, and Congress often acts on the basis of political or
other motivations.130 To ensure agency interpretations are entitled to deference only
when Congress has delegated interpretive authority to an agency, the Supreme Court
has introduced additional steps into Chevron’s interpretive framework.131 These
inquiries can be viewed as a way the Court might examine whether Congress has
“acquiesced” in a given application of Chevron because they consider evidence of
Congress’s intent. For example in United States v. Mead, the Court held that agency
interpretations of statutes qualify for Chevron deference when Congress has
delegated an agency the authority to act with the force of law and the “agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.”132 The Court has also begun to develop a “major questions” exception to

125. See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1679; Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman,
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (“The Supreme Court in recent years has
endorsed the notion that Chevron rests on implied congressional intent.”).
126. Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1679 (“So long as Chevron is understood as a response to
congressional instructions, it does not offend anything in the Constitution.”).
127. See id. at 1626; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2016) (describing Chevron as creating a “policy space” in which
agencies are free to exercise discretion).
128. Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, & Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s
Political Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1476–77 (2018) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at
865) (“As Justice Scalia noted decades ago, ‘The cases, old and new, that accept administrative
interpretations, often refer to the “expertise” of the agencies in question, their intense
familiarity with the history and purposes of the legislation at issue, and their practical
knowledge of what will best effectuate those purposes.’”).
129. See id. at 1481–82.
130. These competing motivations will be discussed in greater detail in Part III.
131. For example, Chevron step zero is an “initial inquiry into whether the Chevron
framework applies at all.” Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191
(2006). The Step Zero inquiry was introduced in United States v. Mead Corp., discussed infra
note 132 and accompanying text. The “major questions” exception, also discussed infra note
133–34 and accompanying text, is another step the Supreme Court has introduced into
Chevron’s interpretive framework.
132. 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (“We hold that administrative implementation of a
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Chevron deference, which is a “[p]resumption against [a] congressional delegation
of authority for [an] agency to make fundamental changes to society or the
market.”133 The major questions doctrine in particular has been deeply criticized by
scholars who view its “unpredictable application as highly destabilizing.”134
Nonetheless, the goal of both inquiries is to ascertain whether Congress has acted on
the basis of constitutional motivations (an intention to delegate to an agency) or on
the basis of other factors.135 If Congress frequently acts on the basis of other factors
when passing statutes to which a court applies Chevron, these additional inquiries
can be viewed as a way to ensure Congress has properly acquiesced in a delegation
of its interpretive power to an agency.136
Scholars and judges alike have proposed or hinted at numerous other ways to
reform Chevron in ways that depend on an examination of congressional intent.
Chief Justice Roberts himself has advocated for a more context-specific inquiry into
whether Congress definitively authorized an agency to interpret a specific ambiguous
provision.137 Other scholars have suggested step one should be taken more seriously

particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that
the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority.”); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero after City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 753, 766 (2014).
133. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW 418 (2016). In other words, the socalled “major questions” exception is the idea that Congress could not have intended to
delegate major legal questions to agencies to decide without sufficient textual support. See
Nathan Richardson, Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent “Major
Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L. REV. 355, 391–92 (2016). Under the “major questions”
exception, the Court has granted agency interpretations of congressional statutes “little or no
weight” when the stakes of the interpretive question are “sufficiently high.” Id. at 358. While
the Court has not laid out the specific factors that give rise to a “major question,” id. at 381,
the Court has cited the following reasons for finding a “major question” exception in recent
cases: the agency interpretation (1) would result in a significant change in the scope of
regulatory authority, (2) has great economic significance, (3) relates to an issue of ongoing
political controversy, (4) is based on a thin statutory basis. Id. at 381–85.
134. Joshua S. Sellers, “Major Questions” Moderation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 930, 946
(2019). More specifically, critics view the major questions doctrine as a way to “selectively
circumvent the traditional deference regime” and prevent agencies from interpreting the kinds
of complex statutory ambiguities that they are best situated to resolve. See id. at 946–47.
135. See id. at 937–39.
136. As the following Section discusses, Congress often passes ambiguous statutes for
reasons other than a constitutionally permissible intention to delegate. See infra notes 139–46
and accompanying text.
137. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 320 (2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing the Court’s rationale for Chevron “rests on a recognition that Congress has
delegated to an agency the interpretive authority to implement ‘a particular provision’ or
answer ‘“a particular question.”’”) (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229
(2001)); see also Eggert, supra note 103, at 784 (“[A]bsent real evidence of congressional
intent, the courts should ask whether and to what extent a rational Congress would intend
courts to defer in the circumstance in question.”). In Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference,
Christopher J. Walker characterizes Chief Justice Robert’s approach as “a context-specific
inquiry into objective congressional intent.” Walker, supra note 109, at 117. The “major
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so that Chevron only applies to genuinely ambiguous statutory provisions.138 Still
others propose that Congress state explicitly what level of deference a court should
afford agency interpretations.139 Again, each of these reforms, if adopted, will
illustrate how the Court examines congressional intent because they show how the
Court determines Chevron is applied on the basis of genuine congressional intent to
delegate.140 In fact, how the Court changes Chevron in the coming years will be
particularly informative for the way the Court views evidence of congressional
intent, and thus the persuasive authority of historical practice, because, as will be
discussed in the following section, Congress faces the same competing motivations
in the context of Chevron as when engaging in a long-standing historical practice.
D. Challenges in Ascertaining Congress’s Motivations
Just as political branches have relied on long-standing historical practices,
Congress and agencies have generated significant reliance interests on Chevron. As
Justin Walker has recently noted, “[a]t the very least, eliminating Chevron deference
would have ‘major practical implications’ for administrative agencies and the parties
they regulate.”141 More specifically, Congress has long legislated against the
background of Chevron, and many statutes reflect an understanding that the Court’s
deference doctrines will apply.142 Agencies themselves have operated on a similar

question” doctrine is an example of this context specific approach. See id. at 115–16; see also
supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
138. Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1672; Walker, supra note 109, at 117 (noting Justice Scalia
and Judge Kethledge among the advocates for this approach).
139. See Eggert, supra note 103, at 782. Eggert discusses two ways in which Congress
could explicitly state the level of deference a court should afford to an agency interpretation.
First, Eggert notes that Congress could codify Chevron by, for example, amending the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to state exactly the conditions in which a court should
defer to an agency. Id. Another possibility would be for Congress to specify in a particular
statute when a court should give weight to an agency interpretation. Id.
140. See City of Arlington, 569 U.S. at 321–22 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“An agency
interpretation warrants such deference only if Congress has delegated authority to definitively
interpret a particular ambiguity in a particular manner.”); Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1678
(noting the goals of reforms to Chevron are to “to ensure the primacy of congressional
instructions, to forbid arbitrariness, and to use time-honored principles—along with some new
ones—to cabin the exercise of agency discretion”); Eggert, supra note 103, at 785 (noting
reforms would allow courts to answer “pertinent policy questions” such as: “Has Congress
given the agency the authority to engage in the kind of formalized rulemaking procedures that
would lead the agency to make a thoughtful, informed determination? Has the agency
appropriately used those procedures and explained its rationale? Is the agency likely to have
particular expertise and/or institutional memory such that it is better able than a court to reach
an appropriate interpretation?”).
141. Justin Walker, The Kavanaugh Court and the Schecter-to-Chevron Spectrum: How
the New Supreme Court Will Make the Administrative State More Democratically
Accountable, 95 IND. L.J. 924, 960 (2020).
142. See Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1672. In fact, a survey of 137 congressional staffers in
2013 indicated eighty-two percent of respondents knew about Chevron and most of them used
it when drafting statutes. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation
from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons:
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assumption.143 Just as in finding a longstanding historical practice unconstitutional,
overturning Chevron would certainly involve “upset[ting] the compromises and
working arrangements that the elected branches of Government themselves have
reached.”144 Beyond mere reliance, there is at least some evidence that this approach
is in fact desirable. As Kent Barnett, Christina Boyd, and Christopher Walker
indicate, Chevron effectively and powerfully restrains partisanship as compared to
other standards of review.145 But just as with the acquiescence model, agreement by
Congress may result from a number of competing reasons.
For example, as discussed earlier in the context of “congressional-executive”
agreements,146 Congress may act on the basis of a strategic political calculation.
Much like the Executive found it easier to secure the approval of the majority of
Congress rather than that of two-thirds of the Senate, individual legislators will often
find it easier to delegate politically contentious questions to the Executive through
passing ambiguous legislation.147 As a result, the Executive Branch will increase its
power and Congress will continue to abdicate its power “because jockeying for
control of the Executive becomes a less transaction-costly way of shaping policy than
the legislative process itself.”148 This is exactly the concern, highlighted earlier, that
Congress faces collective action problems in protecting its constitutional authority.149
Also discussed earlier, and applicable here, is that Congress faces procedural hurdles
in protecting its constitutional authority.150 As a result, if deference is granted to an
agency interpretation when Congress did not intend to do so, it will have a difficult
time passing legislation prohibiting deference, just as Congress has a difficult time
passing legislation opposing historical practices.
Finally, there is the risk that both Congress and judges will be incentivized to
defer to agencies on the basis of policy preferences rather than any determination
that Congress sought deference on the basis of constitutional motivations. First,

Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 993–94 (2013).
143. Sunstein, supra note 99, at 1672.
144. Bradley, supra note 25, at 74.
145. Barnett et al., supra note 128, at 1524; see also Nicholas R. Bednar, What to Do About
Chevron—Nothing, 72 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 151, 153 (2019) (discussing Barnett, Boyd,
and Walker’s research).
146. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
147. See Justin Hurwitz, Chevron’s Political Domain: W(h)ither Step Three?, 68 DEPAUL
L. REV. 615, 629 (2019); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 571
(2009) (“[S]cholars have observed that a divided Congress may choose deliberately
ambiguous words to obtain consensus, thereby delegating interpretive authority to agencies or
courts.”).
148. Hurwitz, supra note 147, at 628. Hurwitz calls such broadly written laws a political
“double-whammy” for legislators. Id. at 629. This is because legislators on both sides of the
aisle can claim a victory in solving a problem, and, regardless of how the agency interprets the
statute, legislators can either claim a victory and campaign on the policy’s success or blame
the agency and campaign on the policy’s failure. Id.; see also Bressman, supra note 147, at
571 (“Congress chooses words that are imprecise enough for legislators with opposing views
each to claim victory. Meanwhile, the language also allows those legislators to press for their
favored positions at the later administrative or judicial level.”).
149. See discussion supra note 83 and accompanying text.
150. See discussion supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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empirical studies have indicated that judges are often more likely to defer to an
agency’s interpretation of a statute when their policy preferences align with those of
the agency.151 Justice Kavanaugh has expressed significant concern over this conflict,
stating that “there can be serious incentives and pressures—often subconscious—for
judges to find textual ambiguity or clarity in certain cases,” as where a judge’s policy
preferences conflict with an agency’s interpretation of a statute.152 Congress itself is
also more likely to defer to an executive branch that shares its policy preferences.153
In other words, as in the constitutional acquiescence model, the question of whether
Congress was motivated by constitutional reasons is complicated by the fact that
Congress is often motivated by nonconstitutional reasons, such as policy preferences.
CONCLUSION
This Note discussed two competing theories used to determine when
constitutional acquiescence applies to a long-standing historical practice:
constitutional liquidation and historical gloss. Both theories, however, face the same
problem when determining whether a long-standing practice between political
branches can serve as evidence of that practice’s constitutionality: Congress often
acts without consideration of the constitutional issue at hand. Some scholars, such as
Baude and Roisman, have attempted to remedy this problem. However, such
scholarship lacks a rigorous method for determining how agreement over the
practice’s constitutionality can be determined in a way that recognizes the actual
dynamics of congressional-executive relations. The current debate around Chevron’s
two-step framework can remedy this problem because Congress faces the same
challenges in expressing its intention to defer to an agency as in expressing its
acquiescence in the constitutionality of an interbranch practice. Specifically,
Congress faces constitutional barriers, collective action problems, and the temptation

151. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2171
(1998) (finding panels of D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals judges were thirty-one percent more
likely to defer when its policy preferences are in line with those of the agency’s); Thomas J.
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of
Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 851 (2006) (finding judges are more likely to defer to the
agency’s interpretation when the agency’s decision is closer to the judge’s political
preference). But see Barnett et al., supra note 128, at 1523–24 (“Utilizing the most
comprehensive circuit court dataset to date, we find that, while there are some statistically
significant results as to partisan influence, Chevron deference has a powerful constraining
effect on partisanship in judicial decisionmaking.”).
152. Kavanaugh, supra note 114, at 2140 (stating judges who find the legislative history
surrounding a statute is more in line with their policy preferences are subtly incentivized to
call the statute ambiguous to allow a result more in line with their preferences; judges who
disagree with the agency’s interpretation are conversely incentivized to find the statute
unambiguous).
153. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2311, 2357 (2006) (noting members of Congress “are significantly more likely to vote
to delegate discretion to an executive branch controlled by their party and that Congress does
indeed delegate significantly less, and with significantly more constraints, when the opposing
party controls the executive branch”).
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to take the path of least political resistance, as well as the temptation to act on the
basis of policy preferences. And, unlike the merits of historical practice arguments,
Chevron is more frequently and rigorously debated and discussed, providing robust
signals about how the Court views congressional action. As a result, the Supreme
Court’s changing approach to Chevron will provide insight into whether the Court
finds congressional agreement to be persuasive evidence of a practice’s
constitutionality in the future.

